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Summary
The European Union (EU), comprised of 15 member states (countries), is one
of the United States’ chief agricultural trading partners and also a major competitor
in world markets.  Both heavily support their agricultural sectors, with a large share
of such support concentrated on wheat, feed grains, cotton, oilseeds, sugar, dairy, and
tobacco.  However, the EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of
farm and food products. 
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) generally has focused on market
intervention to support minimum prices for major commodities, often tied to
production controls.  In recent years, intervention prices have been reduced in favor
of more direct payments, tied to historical production.  Export subsidies (i.e.,
“restitution”) are provided to traders to cover the difference between internal EU and
world market prices for commodities and/or processed foods.  Tariff-rate quotas and
out-of-quota tariffs keep agricultural imports at prices as high as EU internal prices.
In the United States, those with a history of planting land to grains, cotton, and
oilseeds (including peanuts) generally are eligible for both fixed decoupled payments
and for “counter-cyclical assistance” payments (tied to per-bushel or per-pound target
prices); the total producer subsidy is based on past production.  They and producers
of several other commodities also are eligible for crop loans and loan-related
subsidies that provide further support.  Dairy, sugar, and tobacco are supported
through various minimum pricing systems, and some of these commodities are
subject to tariff rate quotas to limit imports. 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the EU and United States in 2001 together accounted for nearly two-thirds
of all government support to agriculture among the major developed economies.
However, EU agricultural spending generally is much higher than in the United
States. The EU spends much more on both domestic support and on direct
agricultural export subsidies.  While the EU has argued that U.S. food aid and loan
deficiency payments are in effect export subsidies and should be counted as such, the
United States disagrees.  
Information comparing how the U.S. and EU governments support their
producers is expected to be of interest to policymakers while negotiations are
underway among world trading partners to further reform agricultural trade.
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Table 1.  U.S.-EU Agricultural Trade
CY1997-2001 (billion dollars)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Exports to EU: 8.9 7.8 6.4 6.2 6.4
Imports from EU: 7.0 7.4 7.9 8.1 7.9
Trade Balance: +1.9 +0.4 -1.5 -1.9 -1.5
Source: USDA, ERS.  Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S.
Agricultural Support Mechanisms in the
European Union:
 A Comparison with the United States
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the United States’ chief agricultural trading
partners and also a major competitor in world markets (see tables 1 and 2, pages 2
and 3).1  Both the EU and United States have trade-oriented agricultural economies
that are heavily supported by their respective governments.  Both face challenges
over the next several years, as they attempt to support their agricultural producers
within spending, trade, and other policy constraints.
T h e  E U
operates under a
C o m m o n
Agricultural Policy
(CAP; see page 4).
The CAP was altered
most recently by a
package of reforms
known as “Agenda
2000.”  This 6-year
program, finalized in
March 1999, was
d e v e l o p e d  i n
anticipation both of
the next “enlargement,” when  additional European countries are expected to enter
the EU, and of the new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations,
where talks on agricultural trade reform are underway.
On July 10, 2002, the European Commission (EC), the EU’s executive body,
tabled a review of the CAP, as required under the Agenda 2000 reforms.  The review
called for a major overhaul of agricultural support (see page 6).
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2 Sources: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Foreign Agricultural Service, and
Economic Research Service (ERS); European Commission, Agriculture in the European
Union: Statistical and economic information 2001, and from ERS.  U.S. and EU farm
definitions are comparable but not identical.
Table 2.  Selected Statistics, U.S. and EU Agriculture, 2000 2
United States European Union
Farms 2.172 million 6.988 million
Average size 434 acres 45 acres
Value of agricultural production $218.6 billion $251.9 billion





Dairy, grains, other field





Agriculture as % of GDP 1% 1.7%
Agricultural employment 2.1 million (1.5% of all
employment; includes
forestry, fishing, ag services )
6.8 million (4.3% of all
employment; includes
forestry, hunting, fishing)
Value of agricultural exports $50.7 billion $53.5 billion
Agricultural  exports (as % of
total agricultural output)
23% 21%
Leading export products Oilseeds/products; feed




Wines and other beverages;
grains; dairy and eggs; fruits
and vegetables; meats;
processed food products
Leading markets Japan, Canada, Mexico, EU U.S., Japan, Switzerland,
Russia

















In the United States, the President signed a  new farm bill (P.L. 107-171, the
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002) that reauthorizes and expands
domestic commodity price and income support programs through 2007.  The measure
also renews and/or amends conservation, export and food aid, the food stamp, farm
credit, rural development, and research programs.  The measure has attracted intense
criticism from U.S. trading partners, particularly the EU, who contend that it will
depress world prices and distort trade – at a time when the United States, in the
current WTO agricultural negotiations, has called for further reforms (including major
reductions) in member countries’ domestic and export programs (see page 7).
Overview of Policies
Both the United States and the EU employ a variety of policy mechanisms to
provide farm-level price and income support.  The programs of both are complex and
costly, although the overall costs of support in the EU are higher than in the United
States (see “Costs of Support,” on page 11).
Many of the two governments’ domestic and export programs either directly or
indirectly support individual commodities.  In both the United States and EU, a large
share of agricultural support is concentrated on wheat, feed grains, cotton, oilseeds,
sugar, dairy, and tobacco.  However, the EU provides extensive support to a broader
range of products that also includes meats, poultry, fruits and vegetables, olive oil,
wine, and various animal feeds. 
EU support generally has focused on market price support provided through
institutional prices, tied for many commodities to production controls.  In more recent
years, intervention prices (essentially, minimum farm prices) have been reduced.
Direct payments, tied to historical acreage and yields and land-aside requirements,
partially are replacing lost producer income.  Export restitutions (refunds) are
provided to traders to cover the difference between the higher internal EU commodity
prices they must pay and lower world market prices they receive.  Export taxes are
sometimes used when world prices are higher than domestic prices, keeping farm
goods at home and (critics argue) needed supplies out of world markets.  Tariff rate
quotas protect EU producers by keeping import prices as high as EU internal prices.
In the United States through 2007, those who had land in grains, cotton, oilseeds,
and peanuts generally are receiving direct income support payments, based on their
past production of these crops.  Those with a production history in these crops also are
eligible for “counter-cyclical assistance,” tied to per-bushel or per-pound target prices,
whenever market prices are low.  Producers of these crops, and of several other
commodities, also are eligible for nonrecourse marketing assistance loans and loan
deficiency payments.  Dairy, sugar, and tobacco are supported through various
minimum pricing systems, with tariff-rate quotas to limit imports.  Export and food
aid programs include the Export Enhancement Program (little used since 1995), the
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3 More details on these support methods appear later in this report.
4 Sources for this section include USDA, Economic Research Service (ERS), The European
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: Pressures for Change, October 1999; ERS, The
European Union – Common Agricultural Policy, updated May 30, 2002, at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/PolicyCommon.htm and various EC
documents, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/index_en.htm .
5 The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: Pressures for Change.
Dairy Export Incentive Program, the Food for Peace and other food aid mechanisms,
and export credit guarantees.3 
U.S. and EU agricultural producers and other rural landowners also may have
access to a variety of other programs such as: input, investment, and infrastructure
aids like farm credit at below-market interest rates; conservation, environmental, and
resource retirement programs; and subsidized crop insurance and natural disaster aid.
In addition, the United States and the EU operate and/or fund numerous general
services of benefit to agriculture and rural areas, such as research, education and
information activities; pest and disease control programs; and market regulation,
inspection, and grading services.
European Union4
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the body of legislation and practices
under which the 15 member states (countries) of the EU jointly set a common, unified
policy framework for agriculture.  The main objectives of the CAP, which took effect
in 1962, in part reflected lingering post-World War II concerns about food shortages
and long-term food security.  The CAP therefore aimed to increase agricultural
productivity, support farm income, stabilize markets, guarantee regular supplies of
agricultural products, and ensure reasonable prices to consumers.
Three basic principles have guided the CAP: (1) free movement of agricultural
commodities within the EU based on common prices, no national barriers to trade, and
harmonization of technical regulations; (2) preference for EU products over those
from outside countries, maintained through import protections; and (3) joint financing
of the CAP by its member countries.
Since its inception, the CAP has “brought about a massive reversal in the
agricultural trading position of the EU, transforming the world’s largest importer of
temperate-zone agricultural products into the world’s second largest exporter of food
and agricultural products.”5  Many within the EU view the CAP as a successful policy
that has vastly improved the EU’s global trade position, helped to keep farmers on the
land, and protected rural areas.
But any such benefits have come at a high cost.  Steady productivity gains have
increased supplies beyond domestic consumer demand.  European farmers have
continued to be supported through commodity intervention schemes that have held
prices for many commodities at levels far above world prices, and high direct export
subsidies have been instituted to move surpluses into foreign markets.  This in turn
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6 The EU, which began with six members as the European Economic Community in 1957,
now consists of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, and Austria.
7 The euro was valued at nearly $1.10 about the time the EU agreed to Agenda 2000 (March
1999).  By late 2000, its value had declined to around 85 cents.  As of July 2002, it had
reached approximate parity with the dollar.
8 The CAP reform – A policy for the future, a fact sheet available through the EC website.
has led to high EU budgetary outlays, wider use of supply controls, and increased
tensions with the United States and other major agricultural traders.
Achieving reforms to address such problems has always been difficult for the
EU, due among other things to a complex decision-making process involving 15
members, each of them a sovereign state with often very differing economic
circumstances and policy views.6  CAP policies are proposed by the European
Commission (EC: consisting of 20 Commissioners appointed for 5-year terms from
member states, where they have generally held high elective or administrative
positions).  Policies in turn generally are subject to agreement by the Council of
Agricultural Ministers of the EU member states.  Voting procedures effectively enable
three or even fewer countries to block a decision, according to both EU and USDA
officials.
MacSharry Reforms.  With the negotiations that were to culminate in the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA; see page 10) then underway,
the EU in 1992 adopted its most significant CAP changes to date.  Widely known as
the “MacSharry reforms,” after the former EU agricultural commissioner who pressed
for them, beginning in 1993, intervention prices for major commodities – cereals,
beef, and dairy products – were reduced, and supply controls were extended to
additional products.  To partly compensate farmers, the EU instituted direct payments
linked to historical production and to environmentally sound production practices
(volume limitations on certain commodities apply).  Such direct payments are more
transparent than subsidies provided through market price intervention (which are
hidden in higher consumer costs), and therefore are more susceptible to cost-cutting
pressures, USDA has noted.  (However, the payments do not fully compensate
producers for revenue lost due to cuts in intervention pricing, EU officials note.)
Agenda 2000.  Agenda 2000 also fixes annual CAP spending through 2006 at
40.5 billion euros in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.  Another 4.5 billion euros
annually are set for rural development.7  Agenda 2000 reorients CAP objectives not
only to promote a competitive agricultural sector able to exploit world market
opportunities but also to provide “a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community.”  Objectives also include food safety and quality; assuring the diversity
of European food production; rural development; and preservation of natural resources
and of the “visual amenity of the countryside” (i.e., environmental and landscape
protection), among others.  “In short, the new policy seeks to support the maintenance
of the specific model of agriculture which is a key part of Europe’s heritage, one that
recognizes the multifunctional nature of European agriculture and the wide range of
benefits it produces.”8
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10 The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: Pressures for Change.
11 The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: Pressures for Change.
This concept of the “multifunctionality of agriculture” is a fundamental element
of EU policy that several other governments (e.g., Japan and Korea) also support.  It
is a controversial issue in the WTO agricultural trade negotiations.  The United States,
Australia, and some others view it as a disguised rationale for shielding domestic
producers through the use of trade-distorting support and protection.9   
USDA has observed that even in the wake of its recent reforms, EU agriculture
remains highly protected.  High export subsidies, along with border measures that
make it difficult for many imports to penetrate European markets, are still EU
mainstays.  “The CAP continues to insulate much of EU agriculture from world
market forces.  This insulation largely exempts EU producers and consumers from
adjustments required in the global agricultural sector and increases the adjustments
imposed on countries with open agricultural markets.  The CAP...remains a dominant
influence on international agricultural markets and trade.”10 
ERS has concluded that internal market forces, EU enlargement, and the WTO
negotiations “all put pressure on the CAP largely by undermining its reliance on
export subsidies to rid itself of surplus.  Until these pressures force significant changes
on the CAP, it will continue to depress world markets as Agenda 2000 does not
substantially reduce incentives to produce and export agricultural commodities.”11
Mid-Term Review.  In a mid-term review of Agenda 2000, EU Agriculture
Commissioner Franz Fischler, on July 10, 2002, proposed a major overhaul of the
CAP.  The proposal calls for:
! Decoupling direct farm payments from production of specific
commodities, instead providing payments to farms based upon
historical support; and conditioning the new payments on compliance
with environmental, food safety, animal welfare, and occupational
safety standards;
! Reducing farm payments (except to small farmers) by 3% annually,
to a total of 20%, capping them to individual farms at 300,000 euros
per year, and redistributing the savings (estimated at 500 to 600
million euros in 2005) to member states for rural development
activities, particularly in poorer areas;
! Lowering market intervention prices in the cereals sectors;
“adjusting” assistance in the dried fodder, protein crop and nuts
sectors; and “simplifying” the direct payment system for beef.
The EU’s foreign trading partners reacted positively to the EC proposal.
However, it faces an uncertain future.  Ten of the 15 EU member country farm
ministers – led by France and Spain –  were sharply critical of the recommendations.
They complained that the mid-term review was envisioned to be a “review” of
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agricultural developments, not a reform proposal.  Such a proposal should come later
as a part of global reforms, particularly in the wake of a new U.S. farm bill that
increases subsidies and maintains their ties to production, critics argued.
United States12
The federal government’s farm price and income support programs, which
comprise the heart of U.S. farm policy, have existed since the Great Depression.  They
were devised to help the millions of U.S. farm families, the majority of them poor,
cope with precipitously falling commodity prices.  At the time, agriculture produced
primarily for domestic markets, and farm residents represented roughly one-fourth of
the entire U.S. population.
Since then, farm residents have declined to less than 2% of the U.S. population,
and American agriculture has changed profoundly, into a highly technological, capital-
intensive industry that has boosted its production far beyond what can be absorbed
through domestic consumption.  World markets have become critical for absorbing
this production capacity.  (The need for world markets is no less important for the EU,
where domestic consumption lags more, due to its aging population and to low income
growth.)
Meanwhile, U.S. farm policies have retained many of their early features.
Congress still requires the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to intervene in
major agricultural markets through various combinations of direct payments, price
intervention, and even supply management.  Support is mandated for more than two
dozen specified commodities.  In addition, USDA has broad discretionary authority
to assist producers of virtually any other agricultural commodity.  Export programs
and import protections also are sometimes employed to assist segments of the farm
sector.
The programs of the 1930s and 1940s have, in fact, evolved, in response both to
changes in agriculture and to fiscal, political, and trade pressures.  Over the past three
decades, successive Congresses and Administrations have sought to steer price and
income support programs onto a more “market-oriented” course, so that producers
might look to the private market rather than to government for production incentives
and economic rewards.  A succession of farm bills since the 1970s slowly nudged
farm policy away from such tools as high commodity-based price supports, rigid
production controls, and publicly-held and managed surplus stocks. 
1996 Farm Bill.  The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 (FAIR; P.L. 104-127) was aimed at accelerating this shift toward a more market-
oriented policy.  Among other things, the FAIR act curtailed annual acreage reduction
programs and acreage and yield-based payments tied to high target prices for grains
and cotton, giving producers more “planting flexibility.”  In their place, such
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OECD was established to promote economic growth, higher living standards, and trade
expansion worldwide.  Members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, S. Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
producers received 7 years of gradually declining “production flexibility contract
payments” no longer coupled to what they produced.  The law also ended farmer-
owned grain reserves.  It continued marketing loan repayment provisions, enabling
farmers to repay their USDA crop loans at less than the per-bushel loan rates, if
market prices are lower than those rates. (Also continued were loan deficiency
payments, available to non-borrowers when the marketing loan repayment provisions
are in effect.)  The intention was to avoid forfeitures of those loans to the government
(which would otherwise acquire the crops placed as collateral).  Finally, the honey,
wool, and mohair programs were not re-enacted, and the longstanding surplus dairy
purchase program was slated to end after 1999.
The 1996 law retained other features of the old programs besides marketing
loans.  USDA was required to continue price support programs for dairy, sugar,
peanuts, and tobacco that included forms of supply management for the latter two.
The approximately $36 billion in market transition payments, although no longer tied
to current production, generally went to the same wheat, feed grain, rice, and cotton
land holders who benefitted from the previous programs, because the payments were
based on past crop-specific program enrollment.
Unanticipated shocks to the agricultural economy since enactment of the 1996
law led to the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars in additional farm assistance.
First, USDA outlays for marketing loan assistance have been much higher than
policymakers expected in 1996, due to the decline in world market prices.  Second,
Congress passed a series of laws from 1998 through 2001 providing an additional $30
billion in ad hoc aid, over and above amounts that would have been available through
the 1996 act alone.  Some of the money was to compensate producers for disaster-
related losses, but about $23 billion was to help them cope with deteriorating market
conditions and low prices.  Market loss payments were distributed mainly to those
receiving annual transition payments, effectively based on the same 1996 allocation
formula – meaning that grain and cotton producers were major beneficiaries.
However, producers of such commodities as tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, livestock,
and produce also have received ad hoc direct payments, not traditionally a form of
assistance to them.  Congress also extended the life of the dairy price support program
and mandated some direct payments to dairy producers. 
Such emergency provisions compensating farmers for low prices are “deviations”
from the market-oriented 1996 farm act, and, among other things, “have reduced the
influence of market signals on farmers’ production decisions,” according to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).13
2002 Farm Bill.  As legislative work began on a new farm policy to replace the
1996 bill, which was due to expire in 2002, U.S. farm interests were seeking a more
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cost (direct budget authority) for the entire farm bill, which also includes agricultural trade
and food aid, domestic nutrition (mainly food stamps), rural development, research, and
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predictable method of helping producers through “temporary” times of economic
distress, a concept that came to be known as “counter-cyclical assistance.”  This
concept was incorporated as a key element into the final bill, signed in May 2002 by
President Bush.  The following provisions are among those for supporting the U.S.
farm sector through 2007:
! Those who previously planted wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice,
peanuts, soybeans, and other oilseeds are eligible both for fixed
decoupled payments and for counter-cyclical deficiency payments
that make up the difference between a per-unit (bushel; pound)
“target price”and the market price plus the fixed payment.  Both
payments are based on 85% of the farm’s past production history, but
a recipient does not have to plant these crops to receive the
assistance. 
! Current producers of the above crops, along with producers of ELS
cotton, wool, mohair, honey, dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas can
receive nonrecourse marketing assistance loans.  
! Sugar continues to be supported through a combination of import
quotas and nonrecourse loans, with certain supply controls authorized
to control budget outlays.
! Milk price support continues through USDA purchases of surplus
dairy products, supplemented by a new system of counter-cyclical
payments to farmers when the fluid milk price declines below a
statutory target.
The budgetary cost of these commodity programs is estimated to average above
$16 billion annually through 2007.  When conservation programs are added, spending
for the farm sector could average about $20 billion annually.14 
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and the Dairy Export Incentive
Program (DEIP), the primary U.S. export subsidy programs which started in 1985,
were retained, although EEP has been little used in recent years and DEIP spending
is constrained within WTO-permitted levels.  U.S. food aid in FY1999 reached its
highest level in 25 years, a program level of approximately $3 billion (declining to
around $2 billion annually since then), leading some foreign critics to charge that such
aid primarily is, in effect, a proxy for export subsidies in response to low farm prices.
Although many recent program modifications have been fueled by concerns
about short-term market conditions, a number of longer-term objectives are offered
for U.S. farm policy.  These include keeping the U.S. farm sector competitive in world
markets; providing at least some level of support to undergird individual producer
incomes; helping farmers and ranchers manage risks, particularly from natural
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disasters; ensuring that consumers have an abundance of food and fiber at reasonable
prices; stabilizing commodity markets; increasing agricultural efficiency; preserving
the family farm; feeding the hungry; conserving natural resources; and supporting
rural economies, among others.  Some of these objectives have been clearly stated in
farm laws, while others may arise only in the course of congressional debate.  A
number of objectives would appear, on their face, to be difficult to achieve without
undermining others.  However, their breadth and number help to secure wider support
for passage of farm legislation.
Nonetheless, the 2002 farm bill has come under intense criticism particularly
from foreign countries, who contend that the scope and level of subsidies in the new
law will stimulate U.S. overproduction, depress world prices, amplify global market
distortions, and belie the U.S. position in the current trade negotiating round that the
world’s agricultural subsidies should be sharply curtailed.  Besides raising questions
about U.S. sincerity regarding its trade negotiating position, the new farm bill will
encourage other countries to increase their domestic subsidies and/or import barriers
to protect their own farmers, these critics contend.
The bill’s defenders counter that the United States cannot unilaterally reduce its
own supports before the EU, which spends far more than the United States (see table
on page 14), and others agree to do likewise.  The measure, with its vigorous program
of supports, places U.S. negotiators in a much stronger bargaining position to demand
that competitors not only reduce their domestic subsidies but also their generally much
higher tariffs and (in the case of the EU) export subsidies, defenders add.  
WTO Obligations
The United States and EU share the broad goal of maintaining diverse,
prosperous agricultural sectors that are competitive in world markets.  However, some
of their programs and policies do in fact have the potential to strongly influence  – and
distort –  production, marketing, and prices. Recognizing this, the 1994 Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) obligates WTO member countries to
discipline their domestic farm support spending and export subsidy programs so as to
facilitate more open trade.  WTO countries also agreed to begin reducing their barriers
to agricultural imports.
The Agreement requires that export subsidies be reduced, generally 6 years, by
21% (in quantities) for specified commodities (for example, dairy or wheat), and by
36% (in government outlays).  No new export subsidies may be introduced for
commodities not previously receiving them.  Furthermore, the Agreement defines the
types of subsidy programs that are subject to these reductions, such as direct payments
enabling exporters to offer commodities to foreign buyers at lower prices, and those
that are exempt, such as bona fide food aid or export market promotion services.
The Agreement likewise requires member countries to control their domestic
farm subsidies, primarily by reducing supports that have the most potential to distort
trade, by 20% from a base period (1986-88) over a 6-year period.  Exemptions are
made for those least likely to distort trade, such as general services and many
environmental programs.
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15 Such subsidies may be either direct government spending or the subsidies represented by
the difference between higher administered higher prices and lower world prices, for
example.  The EU is permitted a much higher annual limit on trade-distorting subsidies. See
CRS Rept. RL30612, Farm Support Programs and World Trade Commitments.
16 Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation, 2002.  Information
also is drawn from the 2000 and 2001 editions of this report. 
17 The OECD defines PSE as “an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers
from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level,
arising from policy measures which support agriculture, regardless of their nature,
objectives, or impacts on farm production or income.”  PSE counts market price support, all
payments based on output, on acreage, on animal numbers, on historical entitlements, on
input use, on input constraints, on overall farming income, and miscellaneous payments.
The PSE can be expressed as a monetary aggregate or percentage.  The OECD
measurements of support discussed in this section are not the same as the measurements
(continued...)
Like other members, both the United States and the EU must operate their
respective programs within the constraints of this Agreement.  Thus, the UR
commitments have been a key consideration as each government in recent years has
shaped and modified its farm policies.  The 2002 U.S. farm bill contains a so-called
“circuit breaker” requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to attempt to keep farm
program support within the annual URAA limit on U.S. trade-distorting domestic
farm subsidies, of $19.1 billion.15
Costs of Support
The EU and United States for many decades have spent significantly more money
to support their agricultural sectors than other countries.  The Uruguay Round
disciplines notwithstanding, some of the major agricultural traders, including the EU
and United States, in the past several years spent more on farm supports than at any
time since the mid-1980s, according to the OECD – although support among all
OECD countries has been declining for 2 years (2000-2001) after 2 years of increases.
OECD has attributed the changes in spending more to world commodity price and
exchange rate movements than to agricultural policy reforms.  Such reforms have been
“slow, variable, and insufficient.”16
In 2001, the OECD countries spent an estimated $311 billion in total support to
agriculture.  About three-quarters of this support went to producers; the rest funded
general services like inspection, research, and marketing.  The EU and United States
together accounted for nearly 65% of this $311 billion – the EU with about $106
billion and the United States with some $95 billion.  Putting these high expenditures
into perspective, the two have the largest overall economies in the world, and their
agricultural sectors also dominate global markets, which is why much of the world is
so concerned about U.S. and EU agricultural practices and policies. 
According to OECD calculations, the EU provided an annual average producer
support estimate (PSE) of 36% of its gross farm receipts in 1999-2001, compared with
an average annual PSE of 42% in 1986-88.17  The U.S. PSE was an annual average of
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used for WTO notifications under the URAA.  For a more detailed explanation, see Farm
Support Programs and World Trade Commitments.
18 The OECD definition of full-time farmer equivalent counts all forms of farm labor:
farmers, hired employees, and unpaid family workers to the extent the data are available.
The per hectare calculation defines agricultural acreage as the sum of arable land and land
under permanent crops and permanent meadows and pastures. 
23% of gross farm receipts in 1999-2001, compared with 25% in 1986-88.  Figure 1
compares the EU and U.S. percentages with those for other selected OECD countries.
OECD also annually calculates producer support per full-time farmer and per
hectare of land.18  Support per farmer in the United States (where commercial farms
are larger than in the EU), increased from an annual average of $16,000 in 1986-88,
to $21,000 in 1999-2001.  In the EU, support per farmer increased from $10,000 in
1986-88 to $16,000 in 1999-2001. 
The average EU subsidy was $696 per hectare ($282 per acre) in 1986-88,
compared with $722 per hectare ($292 per acre) in 1999-2001.  For the United States,
the average per-hectare subsidy was $98 ($40 per acre) in 1986-88, compared with
$122 ($49 per acre) in 1999-2001.
Comparative EU and U.S. subsidies for major commodities (using the PSE as a
percent of gross farm receipts) are shown in figure 2 on the next page. 
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Another yardstick for comparing support to agriculture is to examine only
government spending – i.e., annual budgetary outlays for domestic farm programs and
agricultural export subsidies.  Essentially, this method, unlike the PSE, excludes the
extra support to the farm sector via policy-mandated higher prices paid by processors
and consumers (more prevalent in the EU than in the United States).  As table 3 on
page 14 illustrates, these annual budgetary outlays in recent years have been much
higher in the EU than in the United States.  However, U.S. outlays for domestic farm
support have been higher than they were in the mid-1990s due to the ad hoc farm
spending measures (see page 8).  Still, the fact that the burden on consumers is not
accounted for in this yardstick may make it a less useful comparison.
As table 3 also shows, the EU spends much more than the United States on
agricultural export subsidies, too.  U.S. officials calculate, based on WTO
notifications, that the EU is responsible for 90% of all reported export subsidies.  The
EU contends that the assertion is misleading because U.S. food aid spending, which
is higher than the EU, is not included in such reports.  U.S. annual program levels for
food aid have averaged nearly $2 billion over the past decade.  The EU argues that this
type of food aid spending increases during periods of low prices and high surpluses
– indicating an “abuse of food aid...comparable to an export subsidy of 100% of the
price of the product.”19  The EU also has argued that U.S. export credit guarantees and
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20 EC.  OECD “monitoring” report 2000, discussion paper.  June 9, 2000.
21  Table is from U.S. Agricultural Trade: Trends, Composition, Direction, and Policy (CRS
Rept. 98-253 ENR), updated July 2002.  Figures derived from USDA and EU data.
commodity loan deficiency payments are, in effect, export subsidies, and should also
be counted.20
Table 3.  Comparison of U.S. and EU Government Spending




1999 2000 2001e 2002e
Export
Subsidies a
5.984 5.283 3.396 3.328
Domestic
Support b
32.660 29.119 29.720 34.443
Total 38.644 34.402 33.116 37.771
United
States
1999 2000 2001 2002e
Export
Subsidies c
0.390 0.414 0.157 .663
Domestic
Support d
18.272 18.338 24.945 17.206
Total 18.662 18.702 25.102 17.869
e=estimate
a/  EU export subsidies include export refunds (amounts paid to exporters  who bought at
high internal market prices and sold at world market prices), but exclude food aid.
b/  EU domestic support includes expenditures for intervention purchasing and other price
support measures, production and processing subsidies, set-aside and income support,
monetary compensatory amounts, and stock depreciation. 
c/  U.S. export subsidies include net outlays of the Commodity Credit Corporation for the
Export Enhancement Program,  Dairy Export Incentive Program, Export Credit Guarantee
Programs, and the Market Access Program.  Foreign food aid is excluded.
d/  U.S. domestic support includes net CCC outlays, including 1999 emergency assistance,
interest payments, and operating expenses, minus CCC export outlays.  Conservation Reserve
Program spending is excluded.
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Comparison of Assistance Tools
The following pages provide a side-by-side description that attempts to cover
many, but not all, major tools used by the EU and United States for assisting
agriculture.  This description: 
• Does not include many of the programs that may be offered by individual EU
countries or by U.S. states, or privately funded efforts, such as producer-funded
export programs and commodity promotion activities.
• Provides levels of price support for illustrative purposes only.  These figures are
not intended to be comparative – or necessarily the most current.
• Explains methods of support that are authorized but may not necessarily be in
effect currently, for various reasons.  For example, some mechanisms come into
play only when market prices for a certain commodity decline to a prescribed
level, or when some other market condition occurs.  Also, not all producers may
be eligible for the particular policy tool being described.
• Draws primarily from the following sources: The European Union’s Common
Agricultural Policy: Pressures for Change; ERS’s EU website,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/region/europe/polcap.htm; various European
Commission documents, including recent annual editions of The Agricultural
Situation in the European Union and from http://www.europa.eu.int/index-
en.htm; C.A.P. Monitor, published by Agra Europe, London; various WTO
notifications by the EU and United States; attache reports from USDA’s Foreign




Intervention prices/purchasing:  The EU is obligated to purchase, at intervention
prices, many grains (wheat, barley, corn, rye, sorghum, and durum wheat) offered by
farmers and traders who are unable to sell at a higher price on the private market.
Intervention sales can only be made during specified periods of each year.  The basic
intervention price is 101.31 euros/metric ton (MT) for the 2001/2002 marketing year;
it may be increased in 7 monthly steps of 0.93 euros each.
Area compensatory payments: Used with land set-aside requirements, these are part
of the CAP’s broader consolidated support system for “arable crops,” which also
covers oilseeds and certain protein crops (linseed, hemp).  Farmers receive decoupled
payments, per hectare (2.47 acres), expressed in 63 euros/MT ton for the 2001/2002
and subsequent marketing years.  They are called “compensatory” because they partly
offset losses from reductions in intervention prices that began after 1992.  Each EU
region has a limit on total payments; EU countries develop regionalization plans to set
payments based on historical yields.  Thus, producers in higher-yielding regions tend
to receive higher payments.  For durum wheat, a supplementary payment is offered,
of 344.5 euros/hectare in traditional areas and 138.9 euros in other areas, subject to
the regional caps.
Land set-aside (compulsory and voluntary):  Farmers must set aside cropland in
exchange for area compensatory payments.  The basic set-aside rate is 10% through
2006, but can be adjusted if necessary.  Set-aside land must be managed to protect the
environment, but can also be used to grow certain non-food and non-feed crops.
Farmers producing less than 92 tons of grain are exempt from set-aside.  Farmers may
set aside additional acres for the set-aside payment (equal to the area payment).
Import controls: Imports are tightly regulated through tariff-rate quotas (TRQs, where
in-quota imports are usually subject to a lower or no tariff, but those above the quota
face a much higher, and often prohibitive, tariff), required import licenses, and other
rules.  EU countries are required, under world trade rules, to provide “minimum
access” levels for grain imports, and the necessary TRQs have been established.  (In
2002, the EU announced plans to restructure its grain import controls.)
Export “restitutions” (refunds); export levies:  EU exporters receive “restitutions”
(a subsidy) to bridge the gap between higher internal prices and lower world market
prices.  Refund rates are determined weekly following fixed criteria.  Exports also
require licenses.  Export levies may apply when world prices are higher than domestic
prices to discourage exports to protect EU supplies.
Rice:  Producers are supported through a system of government intervention
purchasing (at an intervention price of 298.35 euros/MT of paddy rice); per-hectare
compensatory payments (52.65 euros/MT); national hectare bases for rice to which the
payments are tied; production refunds to processors of starch and certain other rice-
derived products; and export refunds to bridge the gap between higher EU rice prices
and lower world market prices. Import protection takes the form of: required licenses;
tariffs tied to the difference between import and reference prices; and additional duties
which may be imposed when import prices fall below specified “trigger prices” or
import volumes exceed specified “trigger volumes.”
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GRAINS:  UNITED STATES
Fixed decoupled payments: Producers with land planted in the past to wheat, rice, or
feed grains are eligible for fixed payments so long as they maintain that land in
agricultural or conserving uses (they do not have to plant these particular crops on that
land in order to receive payments, thus their “decoupled” nature). The total payment
is calculated by multiplying 85% of established acreage, times the farm’s per-acre
yield history, times a statutorily-set per unit rate.  These rates (through the 2007 crops)
are 52¢/bushel (bu.) for wheat, 28¢/bu. for corn, 35¢/bu. for grain sorghum, 24¢/bu.
for barley, 2.4¢/bu. for oats, and $2.35/100 pounds (cwt.) for rice.  Annual per-person
limits on total benefits apply. 
Counter-cyclical deficiency payments: Farmers may be eligible for payments to make
up the difference between a crop’s average market price plus the fixed decoupled
payment (above) and its statutorily-set, per-unit target price.  The total payment is
based upon past production history generally as calculated for fixed payments (see
above).  Target prices for the 2002 and 2003 crops are: $2.60/bu. for corn, $2.54/bu.
for grain sorghum, $2.21/bu. for barley, $1.40/ bu. for oats, $3.86/bu. for wheat, and
$10.50/cwt. for rice (most will increase somewhat in later years).  Annual per-person
limits on total benefits apply. 
Marketing loan gains & loan deficiency payments: Current producers of these crops
are eligible for nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, whereby they pledge their
harvested grain (wheat, rice, corn, barley, sorghum, oats) as collateral for loans from
USDA, at statutorily set per unit rates.  These rates for the 2002 and 2003 crops are:
$1.98/bu. for both corn and grain sorghum, $1.88/bu. for barley, $1.35/bu. for oats,
$2.80/bu. for wheat, and $6.50/cwt. for rice (most will decline somewhat in later
years).  Loans must be repaid within 9 months or else the borrower forfeits the
collateral crop to USDA, which has “no recourse” other than to accept it in lieu of
repayment.  To limit forfeitures, a “marketing loan” feature enables the producer,
when market prices drop below loan rates, to repay the loan at a USDA-calculated
market price and retain ownership of the commodity.  The difference between the
original loan and the lower repayment rate constitutes the amount of the subsidy.
When market prices are below loan rates, loan deficiency payments (equal to
marketing loan gains) also are offered to eligible producers who choose to forgo such
loans.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Hard white wheat incentive payments:  For 3 years, an additional $20 million is to
be paid to producers to ensure that hard white wheat on not more than 2 million acres
meets minimum quality standards.
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OILSEEDS: EUROPEAN UNION
Area compensatory payments: Used with land set-aside requirements (see below),
compensatory payments are part of the CAP’s broader consolidated support system
for “arable crops,” which cover not only oilseeds but also cereals and certain protein
crops.  Producers of approved varieties of rapeseed, sunflowers, soybeans, and linseed
receive direct payments, per hectare (2.47 acres), expressed in 63 euros/MT for the
2002/2003 marketing year and thereafter.  They are commonly called “compensatory”
because they partly offset the loss of previous production subsidies.  Until 2002, this
support was tied to regionalized historic, average yield levels.  By 2002/2003, oilseeds
support becomes aligned with the per-hectare payments and land set-asides for cereals,
and no longer is a separate program.
Maximum guaranteed areas:  Until 2002/2003, when oilseeds support became
integrated with that for cereals, oilseed plantings were restricted to maximum
guaranteed areas (MGAs) totaling 5.482 million hectares for the EU-15, in order to
comply with the 1992 “Blair House” agreement between the EU and United States.
Land set-aside:  Producers, unless they are small, must set aside a minimum of 10%
of their arable land to qualify for compensatory payments (for more information, see
EU grains discussion on previous page).
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OILSEEDS: UNITED STATES
Fixed decoupled payments: Producers with land planted in the past to soybeans or
other oilseeds (sunflower, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed) are
eligible for fixed payments so long as they maintain that land in agricultural or
conserving uses (they do not have to plant these particular crops on that land in order
to receive payments, thus their “decoupled” nature).  The total payment is calculated
by multiplying 85% of established acreage, times the farm’s per-acre yield history,
times a statutorily-set per unit rate (44 ¢/bu. for soybeans, 0.8¢/lb. for other oilseeds,
through the 2007 crops).  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Counter-cyclical deficiency payments: Farmers may be eligible for payments to make
up the difference between an oilseed crop’s average market price plus the fixed
decoupled payment (above) and its statutorily-set, per-unit (bu., pound) target price.
The total payment is based upon past production history generally as calculated for
fixed payments (see above).  Target prices are $5.80/bu. for soybeans through the
2007 crop and 9.8¢/lb. for other oilseeds through the 2003 crop (10.1 cents from 2004
to 2007).  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Marketing loan gains & loan deficiency payments: Current producers of these crops
are eligible for nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, whereby they pledge their
harvested crop as collateral for loans from USDA, at statutorily set per unit rates of
$5.00/bu. for soybeans through 2007 and 9.6¢/lb. for other oilseeds through 2003 (the
latter rate declining to 9.3¢ in 2004-07).  Loans must be repaid within 9 months or else
the borrower forfeits the collateral crop to USDA, which has “no recourse” other than
to accept it in lieu of repayment.  To limit forfeitures, a “marketing loan” feature
enables the producer, when market prices drop below loan rates, to repay the loan at
a USDA-calculated market price and retain ownership of the commodity.  The
difference between the original loan and the lower repayment rate constitutes the
amount of the subsidy.  When market prices are below loan rates, loan deficiency
payments (equal to marketing loan gains) also are offered to eligible producers who
choose to forgo such loans.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
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COTTON AND OTHER FIBERS: EUROPEAN UNION
Cotton guide price:  Support for cotton is equal to the difference between a guide
price [106.3 euros per 100 kilograms (kg.)] and the world price.  Aid is provided to
ginners who then pay a minimum price to producers.  When unginned cotton
production exceeds a maximum guaranteed quantity, the guide price and amount of
aid are reduced proportionally.  Greece and Spain, the two most significant cotton
producing countries in the EU, are (along with Portugal) assigned maximum quantities
(tonnages).
Hectare aid for hemp and fiber flax:  Producers have been eligible to receive aid for
production of these two crops.  For example, per-hectare rates for the 2001/2002 crops
of hemp and fiber flax were, on per 100 kg. basis, 646.31 euros and 795.46 euros,
respectively.  In July 2000, the EU Agricultural Council had adopted a revised support
scheme integrating support for hemp and fiber flax into that for other arable crops like
grains and oilseeds, bringing gradual reductions in grower payments – to be offset
partially by processing aids (see below). 
Processing aid for hemp and fiber flax:  Aid to primary processors of the straw of
flax and hemp, on the basis of the quantity of the fiber obtained, is being
implemented.  For long flax fiber (mainly used for textiles) such aid will increase from
100 euros/MT in 2001/2002, to 160 euros in 2002/2003 through 2005/2006, and to
200 euros thereafter.  For short flax fiber and hemp not containing more than 7.3%
impurities (used mainly for paper pulp), payments will be 90 euros/MT from
2001/2002 onward.  However, during a transitional period (2001/2002 through
2003/2004), payments can be granted for short fiber flax and hemp fiber that have
higher specified levels of impurities.  To limit expenditures, EU countries are assigned
maximum guaranteed quantities for each type of fiber.
Silkworms:  Growers of silk worms (a small EU industry located mainly in Greece
and Italy) are eligible for production aid for each box of silkworm eggs used.  The rate
for the most recent marketing year was 133.26 euros per box.
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COTTON AND OTHER FIBERS: UNITED STATES
Fixed decoupled payments: Producers with land planted in the past to upland cotton
are eligible for fixed payments so long as they maintain that land in agricultural or
conserving uses (they do not have to plant cotton on that land in order to receive
payments, thus their “decoupled” nature). The total payment is calculated by
multiplying 85% of established acreage, times the farm’s per-acre yield history, times
a statutorily-set rate of 6.67¢/lb. through 2007.  Annual per-person limits on total
benefits apply.
Counter-cyclical deficiency payments: Farmers may be eligible for payments to make
up the difference between an upland cotton crop’s average market price plus the fixed
decoupled payment (above) and its statutorily-set target price of 72.4¢/lb. through
2007.  The total payment is based upon past production history generally as calculated
for fixed payments (see above).  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Marketing loan gains & loan deficiency payments: Current producers are eligible for
nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, whereby they pledge their harvested cotton
as collateral for loans from USDA, at the statutorily set rate of 52¢/bu.  Loans must
be repaid within 9 months or else the borrower forfeits the collateral crop to USDA,
which has “no recourse” other than to accept it in lieu of repayment.  To limit
forfeitures, a “marketing loan” feature enables the producer, when market prices drop
below loan rates, to repay the loan at a USDA-calculated market price and retain
ownership of the commodity.  The difference between the original loan and the lower
repayment rate constitutes the amount of the subsidy.  When market prices are below
loan rates, loan deficiency payments (equal to marketing loan gains) also are offered
to eligible producers who choose to forgo such loans.  ELS (extra-long staple) cotton
is eligible for loans at 79.77¢/lb., but not for loan deficiency payments.  Annual per-
person limits on total benefits apply.
Cotton “competitiveness” provisions: Marketing certificates or cash payments are
made to domestic users and exporters of cotton whenever the 4-week price of U.S.
cotton is too high or not high enough (i.e., when the U.S. price (1) exceeds the world
price by 1.25¢/lb., or (2) does not exceed the U.S. cotton loan rate by at least 134%).
Also, a special  import quota is imposed on cotton when U.S. prices exceed world
prices by 1.25¢ for 4 weeks. A limited global import quota is imposed on upland
cotton when U.S. prices average 130% of the previous 3-year average of U.S. prices.
Seed cotton recourse loans:  Recourse loans (which must be repaid) are available for
all upland and ELS seed cotton, at rates set by the USDA.
Wool and mohair: Producers are eligible for nonrecourse marketing assistance loans
(see cotton for explanation) at rates of $1/lb for graded wool, 40¢/lb. for nongraded
wool, and $4.20/lb. for mohair.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
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SUGAR AND HONEY: EUROPEAN UNION
Intervention prices/purchasing:  The EU is obligated to purchase, at intervention
prices, processed beet, cane, and several other types of sugars that manufacturers
cannot sell on the private market at a price higher than the effective intervention price,
for white sugar 63.19 euros per 100 kg. through the 2005/2006 marketing year.  Beet
“deficit” countries – Ireland, Portugal, Finland, the U.K., and Spain –  have somewhat
higher intervention prices.  To help ensure that producers themselves will be aided,
the government fixes a basic formula-derived price that processors must pay beet
growers (to which the sugar regime is primarily aimed).  In practice, intervention
buying is rarely undertaken, because such buying is part of a broader support system
that relies primarily upon import controls, production quotas, and export subsidies
(financed through industry levies) to maintain higher prices. 
Marketing/production quotas:  Intervention prices only apply to sugar produced
within two quotas, so-called “A” sugar, and additional “B” sugar, which receives a
much lower price guarantee than “A” sugar.  Each of the EU member countries are
assigned “A” and “B” quotas, which in principle are based on past production levels.
Quotas may be transferred (under certain restrictions) among processors within
member countries but not between countries.
Tariff rate quotas:  Foreign (third country) supplies are restricted through the use of
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs).  Most in-quota sugar has been allocated to certain African,
Carribean, and Pacific countries and to India, which have preferential access
agreements; over-quota tariffs are high.  The EU also can rely on a Safeguard Clause
that permits the charging of additional duties, when import prices are below trigger
prices; such duties increase as world prices decline. 
Export subsidies; export levies:  Export refunds (restitutions) are paid to
manufacturers and traders to make up the difference between high internal prices and
lower world prices.  They are based largely on export tenders that traders bid for the
subsidies they need to be competitive in order to sell “A” and “B” sugar in world
markets.  (“C” sugar, produced over and above the “A” and “B” quotas, must be
exported without subsidy at the world market price.)  Refunds are provided for EU-
produced sugar and sugar-containing products (based on sugar content), and also for
preferential sugar imports.  Export levies may apply to protect EU supplies if world
market prices exceed domestic prices.
Producer levies:  To offset the entire EU cost of export subsidies on quota sugar,
growers and processors jointly pay a “co-responsibility” levy under a “self-financing
scheme.”  The “exportable surplus” for which they are responsible generally is the
difference between the sugar production (except “C” sugar) and domestic
consumption.  The basic levy is 2% of the intervention price for white sugar.
Additional levies are imposed if the basic rate fails to cover export refund costs, and
in practice they have been much higher. 
Honey:  EU-wide rules guide the application of country-level measures to improve
honey production and marketing.
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SUGAR AND HONEY: UNITED STATES
Sugar loans: U.S. sugar prices are supported through a nonrecourse loan program 
with statutorily set rates of 18¢/lb. for raw cane, and 22.9¢/lb. for refined beet sugar.
In-process sugar is eligible for loans at 80% of full loan rates.  Loan rates may be
reduced if competing nations sufficiently reduce support.  The loan program is to be
operated at no net cost by avoiding forfeitures to USDA.
Supply management: USDA is authorized to offer inventories of sugar stocks (i.e.,
payment-in-kind, or PIK) in exchange for reducing sugar production and/or plantings.
Tariff rate quotas:  USDA restricts the amount of foreign sugar allowed to enter the
United States to ensure that market prices do not fall below effective support levels.
By maintaining prices at or above these levels, USDA since FY1987 has, except once
in the early 1990s, and again in 2000, ensured that it did not acquire sugar due to a
loan forfeiture.  In practice, WTO trade rules mean that a minimum of 1.256 million
short tons of foreign sugar must be allowed to enter the domestic market each year.
Quantities entering under quota are subject to zero or low duties; above-quota
quantities are subject to much higher tariffs.  USTR in consultation with USDA may
reallocate any shortfall of one country’s shipments to other quota-holding countries.
Honey loans/loan deficiency payments: Producers are eligible for nonrecourse
marketing assistance loans, where they pledge their crop as collateral for loans from
USDA at the statutorily set rate of 60 cents/lb.  Loans must be repaid within 9 months
or else the borrower forfeits the collateral crop to USDA, which has “no recourse”
other than to accept it in lieu of repayment.  To limit forfeitures, a “marketing loan”
feature enables the producer, when market prices drop below the loan rate, to repay
the loan at a USDA-calculated market price and retain ownership of the commodity.
The difference between the original loan and the lower repayment rate is the amount
of the subsidy.  When market prices are below loan rates, loan deficiency payments
(equal to marketing loan gains) also are offered to eligible producers who choose to
forgo such loans.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
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DAIRY: EUROPEAN UNION
Intervention prices/purchasing:  EU intervention agencies in member countries are
obligated to purchase surplus butter and skim milk powder (SMP) at preset prices –
effectively 295.38 euros/100 kg. for butter, and 205.52 for SMP.  Intervention prices
are set to help achieve a pre-set price for farm milk delivered to dairies (at 3.7%
milkfat) of 30.98 euros/100 kg.  Unlike other major EU commodity support, direct aid
to dairy producers will not take effect until 2005; this aid will help cushion cutbacks
in intervention prices (of 15% over 3 years) also set to take effect then.  Payments will
be made both on tons produced and on hectares of pasture. 
Private storage aids:  Intervention agencies may be authorized to pay aid for the
private storage of butter, cream, SMP, and some cheeses.  The system generally aims
to store these products during the surplus season and release them later in the year
when production is lower.  Rates are set annually and can be altered in response to
market conditions.
Marketing quotas:  To limit supply, a system of quotas on milk sales to processors
and consumers has been in place since 1984.  Each member country has a guaranteed
quota that cannot be transferred to another country.  Within countries, individual
quotas are tied to a producer’s holdings, with rules for the sale or lease of such quotas
between farms. If a country’s total quota is exceeded, a levy equivalent to 115% of the
milk target price must be paid; these costs are borne by the individual producers who
exceeded their quotas.
Marketing subsidies for SMP and other dairy products:  Because human food
demand accounts for only about a third of SMP production in the EU, payments are
made for skim milk and SMP used for animal feed.  The level of aid can vary
depending on calculations using the SMP intervention price, the recent supply-demand
situation, and other market price factors.  Aid also may be offered for skim milk
processed into casein and caseinates; for the purchase, at reduced prices, of cream and
butter (particularly by nonprofit institutions and pastry and ice-cream makers); and for
distribution of milk and certain milk products in schools.
Tariff-rate quotas and import licenses:  A system of tariff-rate quotas ensures that
lower-priced imported dairy products do not undermine domestic prices.  The system
requires import licenses for foreign (third country) imports, issued by the intervention
authority in each EU country.  Additional duties may be levied on specified dairy
imports if their prices are below a trigger price. 
Export subsidies:  Refunds may be paid to EU exporters to make up for the difference
between EU and world prices.  Refunds are set periodically by the EC.  Although




Price support purchases:  USDA is required to support the farm price of milk by
offering to purchase surplus nonfat dry milk (NDM), butter, and cheese, that
manufacturers are unable to sell at levels above USDA-prescribed prices.  These
product prices are at levels sufficient to support farm milk prices at the statutorily-set
level of $9.90/cwt.
Milk marketing orders:  The farm price of about three-fourths of all U.S. milk also
is regulated under milk marketing orders (MMOs).  Processors in regions with MMOs
are required to pay minimum prices for fluid-grade (A) milk based on its end use; the
receipts are then pooled so that individual farmers receive a “blend” price for their
production.  For example, Grade A milk used for various manufactured dairy products
(Classes II, III, or IV) receives lower prices than milk used for drinking (Class I, a
price that varies by region).
Counter-cyclical assistance: Whenever the minimum monthly fluid milk price falls
below a target price of $16.94/cwt., each U.S. producer receives a payment equal to
45% of the price shortfall, on up to 2.4 million pounds of their annual milk
production.
Tariff-rate quotas and import licenses:  Tariff-rate quotas are used to ensure that high
imports of lower-priced foreign products do not undermine domestic prices.  A low
tariff rate applies to imports up to a specified quantity; all imports in excess of that
amount are subject to a higher rate.  Import licenses are required for the system, which
covers nearly all dairy product imports.
Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP):  USDA periodically invites private
exporters to bid (on a competitive basis) for cash bonuses needed to complete
negotiated sales of dairy products in targeted countries.  The bonus is a subsidy equal
to the difference between that lower foreign sales price and the exporter’s cost.
CRS-26
BEEF AND VEAL: EUROPEAN UNION
Intervention prices/purchasing:  Intervention purchases, used whenever market
prices were below pre-determined prices, was to end on June 30, 2002.  Since then,
such intervention is only to be used under “extreme market conditions,” more
specifically when market prices in a member state fall below the equivalent of 1,560
euros/MT for 2 consecutive weeks.
Private storage aids: As of July 1, 2002, intervention buying was to be largely
replaced by private storage aid, where payments are made to traders to store beef for
specified periods.  Storage aid may begin when average market prices are below 103%
of the basic price of 2,224 euros/MT.
Special beef premium:  From 2002 onwards, beef producers can receive a special
premium for each steer, of 150 euros made twice (at 9 months and 21 months of age).
For each young bull, a one-time payment is made of 210 euros.  Payments generally
are limited to 90 head for each age; further, each EU country has a total annual ceiling
(e.g., Germany’s is about 1.8 million head.)
Suckler cow premium:  A producer keeping suckler cows on the farm can qualify for
an annual premium, at 200 euros/head in 2002 onwards.  Each country has a total
annual ceiling (e.g., Germany’s is about 640,000 head).  Premium rights can be
transferred or leased temporarily to other producers.
Stocking density/“extensification” premium: The total number of animals qualifying
for the special and suckler cow premiums is limited by the application of a stocking
density on the farm of 1.9 livestock units per hectare (falling to 1.8 units from January
1, 2003.  Producers who comply with stricter stocking density limits can receive the
“extensification” payment of as high as 100 euros/head, made by individual EU
countries.
Slaughter and “deseasonalization” premiums: A producer keeping animals on the
farm for a certain period can qualify for a slaughter premium, granted upon slaughter
or export to a non-EU country.  For bulls, steers, cows, and heifers, the rate is 80
euros/head; for calves, it is 50 euros.  Each country has a total annual ceiling.
Additional payments:  Member countries yearly make additional payments to
producers, within global amounts, to respond to structural and natural disparities in
beef production conditions in different parts of the EU.  These payments may be made
in the form of headage payments and/or area payments.
Tariff rate quotas: An extensive tariff-rate quota system is used to limit imports of
non-EU beef to protect domestic producers.
Export subsidies:  Refunds are paid on exports of beef, veal, and live cattle so that
exporters can offer lower prices on world markets.  Refund rates generally are fixed
for prescribed periods, based on certain market conditions.
CRS-27
BEEF AND VEAL: UNITED STATES
Section 32:  This section of the Act of August 24, 1935 (P.L. 320), provides a
permanent appropriation for supporting a range of U.S. food and agricultural
activities.  Although the program is not designed specifically to support beef and veal,
USDA usually devotes a portion of its available funds each year (for example about
$150-165 million per year in recent years) to purchase beef products (on a bid basis)
to help bolster prices.
Grazing fees:  Producers who graze cattle on federal lands pay fees for those rights
that generally are lower than private fees.  The federal fees are set by formula. 
Tariff rate quotas:  The United States uses tariff-rate quotas to limit foreign beef
imports to protect its domestic producers. 
CRS-28
OTHER ANIMAL PRODUCTS: EUROPEAN UNION
Headage payments for ewes:  An annual premium payment per animal is made for
eligible ewes based on computed income losses when the EU average market price is
unfavorable when compared to the EU basic price, adjusted (the basic price for
2001/2002 was 504.07 euros/100 kg., carcass weight).  Producers of sheep’s milk
qualify for less than those only producing animals for meat.  Supplementary payments
are offered to producers in certain “less favored areas.”  Premium rights may be
transferred or leased.  Limits are placed on the number of ewes for which payments
will be made.
Private storage aids for pigmeat and sheepmeat:  The EU can support private storage
for pigmeat when the reference price is expected to stay below 103% of a basic price
(set at 1,509.39 euros/MT); rates vary depending upon the cut of meat, and are
determined either in advance or by tender.  Private storage aid for sheepmeat can be
used when market prices are below certain computed trigger levels, calculated as
either 90% of the seasonally adjusted EU price or 70% of the basic price (see above);
it is available, normally through a tendering process, only for lamb carcasses less than
12 months old.
Intervention prices/purchasing for pigmeat: Intervention agencies can make pigmeat
purchases whenever the EU reference price (a computed internal market price for pig
carcasses) is predicted to stay below 103% of the basic price (see above).  In practice,
the other support measures are used instead of purchases.
Tariff-rate quotas:  For pigmeat and sheepmeat and live animals, the EU imposes a
system of tariff-rate quotas to limit the supply of non-EU imports to protect its
domestic producers.  Special safeguard measures to further limit imports may be
invoked to protect against import surges and/or very low import prices.  Eastern
European countries have special “concessionary” arrangements for pig meat they
export to the EU.  Similar import protections also are used for poultry meat and
eggs/egg products. 
Export subsidies for pork and poultry:  Export refunds can be paid to pork exporters
to help compensate for high internal feed prices so that they can offer lower prices on
world markets.  Refund rates are under consideration on a weekly basis, tied to a
number of production and market factors.  Export refunds are paid to poultry exporters
for similar reasons, with rates also tied to market conditions.
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OTHER ANIMAL PRODUCTS: UNITED STATES
Lamb meat adjustment assistance program:  Producers are eligible for direct cash
payments “to help improve their opportunity for equitable participation in import
competition,” under a special 4-year program implemented in 1999.  In the first  year,
producers could receive up to $100 for each ram they purchased for breeding, and 50¢
for each sheep enrolled in an authorized sheep improvement program, plus up to 20%
of the cost of a facility improvement; there were caps on payments to individuals for
these activities.  In the second year, payments were set at $3 for each feeder lamb and
$5 for each slaughter lamb (up to an $8/head total for slaughter lambs marketed during
June 1 through July 31).   In years three and four, payments also are available, of $18
for each ewe lamb purchased or retained for breeding purposes.  There currently are
no payment caps, but producers must meet gross income limitations.
Sheep Industry Improvement Center:  Congress in 1996 authorized up to $50 million
($20 million of it mandatory) for a revolving fund to be operated by a new, eventually
privatized, National Sheep Industry Improvement Center.  The Center is authorized
to use the fund to provide loans and loan guarantees to the sheep and goat industries
for such activities as improving production and marketing methods, purchasing
equipment and other inputs, constructing and modernizing processing facilities.
Section 32:  This section of the Act of August 24, 1935 (P.L. 320) provides a
permanent appropriation for supporting a range of U.S. food and agricultural
activities.  Although the program is not designed specifically to support designated
animal products, USDA usually devotes a portion of its discretionary funds each year
(for example about $100-165 million per year in recent years) to purchases of various
products like pork, poultry, lamb, and/or bison (on a bid basis) to help bolster prices.
Grazing fees:  Producers who graze livestock (e.g., sheep) on federal lands pay fees
for those rights that generally are lower than private fees.  The federal fees are set by
formula. 
Economic assistance: The 2002 farm law authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
provide compensation to dairy and other livestock producers for economic losses
related to livestock mortality, feed shortages, “sudden increases” in production costs,
and other losses as the Secretary considers appropriate.  However, such aid is
contingent upon an advance appropriation.
CRS-30
TOBACCO: EUROPEAN UNION
Producer premiums:  Premiums are paid to producers, generally in poorer regions of
the EU, for income support, up to a limit (see “guarantee threshold,” below).
Premiums vary for eight types of tobacco.  For example, the premiums for the
2001/2002 marketing year are about 2.98 euros/ kg. for flue-cured, and 2.38 euros/kg.
for light and dark air-cured types.  Supplementary premiums are offered for certain
types from Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium.  The EU started in 1999 to vary
a portion of the premium to account for quality, deemed to be very low in the EU.
The variable portion (which in several years will account for between 30-45% of total
premium) is paid to producer groups for distribution to their members.
Specific aid:  Producer groups also receive 2% of the premium for such specified
purposes as improving quality and protecting the environment.
Guarantee threshold/production quotas:  The government sets a quantitative limit
called the guarantee threshold on eligible production to limit surpluses.  Thresholds
are set by tobacco type for each country, which in turn divide production quotas
among producer groups, based on their past harvests.  Provisions are in place to enable
the transfer of quota between tobacco types and among producers.
Community tobacco fund:  A deduction of 2% of the premium finances a tobacco
research and information fund that underwrites such activities as discouraging tobacco
consumption; researching less harmful varieties; and seeking options for alternative
farm enterprises. 
Quota buy-back:  Also authorized is a system for the EU to buy back quota to
encourage producers to exit the sector.
Import duties:  Import duties for raw tobacco are much lower than for finished
products, in order to protect EU tobacco processors, who rely heavily on imports due




Price support loans:  Producers are guaranteed minimum selling prices through
USDA nonrecourse loans, which operate in conjunction with marketing quotas (see
below).  If bids at tobacco auction sales fall below the loan rate (in 2002, $1.656/lb.
for flue-cured and $1.835/lb. for burley, the two major U.S. tobacco types), the
producer is paid the loan price by a local price stabilization cooperative with money
borrowed from USDA.  The cooperative then stores the tobacco as collateral for
USDA and acts as the agent to later sell the tobacco in order to repay the loan with
interest.
Marketing quotas:  A national marketing quota is set at a level deemed sufficient to
meet domestic and export demand.  This quota restricts production and enables farm
support to be provided through artificially higher market prices paid by tobacco buyers
and consumers.  From the national quota, individual farm quotas are derived and
assigned to the land; in other words, the right to grow and market a specified quantity
of tobacco resides with the owner of the land.  Quota land may be purchased or rented.
No-net-cost assessment:  An assessment is imposed on all tobacco marketed to
reimburse the government for any financial losses resulting from tobacco operations.
This occurs when cooperatives sell collateral tobacco at less than the loan amount plus
interest (see above).  Growers and buyers each pay half of the assessment, which for
2002 is 5¢/lb. of flue-cured and 2¢/lb. of burley.
Tariff-rate quotas:  Flue-cured and light air-cured (including burley) tobacco imports




Private storage aids:  Such aid is triggered whenever the projected quantity for each
table wine type for the coming year exceeds 4 months’ normal consumption. Nine-
month storage contracts (which can sometimes be extended for 4 months) are offered
to producers for table wine and grape must (crushed wine grapes).  The recent storage
payment rate for table wine was 0.01544 euros/hectoliter (hl.) per day.
Distillation measures:  Such measures, which may be voluntary or compulsory,
depending upon the situation, are used when storage aid alone does not correct market
imbalances.  Distillers pay producers a minimum price to remove table wine from the
market (there are limits on how much can be delivered).  The wine or byproduct then
must be distilled into a product that is at least 52% alcohol by volume.  More
specifically, for example, a preventive distillation program (of up to 7 million hls.)
was introduced during 2000/2001, whereby producers received minimum prices (per
percent of alcohol per hl.) ranging from 1.723 to 2.1054 euros, depending upon
country.  The distillers in turn were eligible for aid ranging from 2.09 to 2.4726 euros.
Under compulsory distillation of wine by-products, producers and distillers also
receive aid, but at lower rates.  Distillers receive assistance for disposing of the
alcohol from distilling; e.g., intervention authorities pay for storage, depreciation, and
disposal costs.  Much of the alcohol ends up being sold, through the intervention
agencies, for fuel – usually, but not always, outside of the EU.
Other aid for grape musts (i.e., grape squeezings and byproducts): Other types of aid
include: enrichment aid to compensate producers for the higher cost of using grape
musts to increase the alcoholic strength of their wines compared with sucrose; aid for
use of EU grape musts and concentrated grape musts for producing British and Irish
home-made wines; and use of grape musts for making grape juice and other grape-
based products.
Supply controls:  New vineyard plantings are prohibited until 2010 unless the
producer has new or replanting rights (with priority given to new, younger growers).
Rights are tied to “reserves” allocated across the EU by country.  Another measure is
the use of premiums to producers who destroy (“grub up”) vineyards, who are paid on
a per-hectare basis, also tied to such variables as yield and type of grape.  Other rules
governing conversion and replanting of vineyards also have been used.
 
Import controls:  Third country imports of wines and wine grape byproducts are
limited by a system of licenses and tariff-rate quotas to protect domestic producers.
Export subsidies:  Producers may be eligible for export refunds, equivalent to the
difference between domestic and world prices, to encourage exports of  table wines.
CRS-33
WINE: UNITED STATES
There are no comparable U.S. intervention programs.
CRS-34
PEANUTS: EUROPEAN UNION
There are no comparable EU intervention programs.
CRS-35
PEANUTS: UNITED STATES
Compensation for quota holders: Until 2002, domestic edible peanut prices were
supported through a system of strict poundage quotas allocated among producers, who
received a much higher price support loan rate for in-quota than for non-quota
(“additional”) peanuts.  The 2002 farm law makes peanut support similar to the
system for grains, oilseeds, and upland cotton.  The law compensates quota holders
for loss of their quotas at $220/short ton (11¢/lb.) per year for 5 years (i.e., for a total
of $1,100/ short ton).
Fixed decoupled payments: Producers with a history of peanut plantings are eligible
for fixed payments so long as they maintain that land in agricultural or conserving
uses (they do not have to plant peanuts on that land in order to receive payments, thus
their “decoupled” nature).  The total payment is calculated by multiplying 85% of
established acreage, times the farm’s per-acre yield history, times the statutorily-set
rate of $36/short ton (1.8¢/lb.).  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Counter-cyclical deficiency payments: Farmers may be eligible for payments to make
up the difference between the average market price for peanuts plus the fixed
decoupled payment (above) and the statutorily-set target price of $495/short ton
(24.75¢/lb.).  The total payment is based upon past production history generally as
calculated for fixed payments (see above).  Annual per-person limits on total benefits
apply.
Marketing loan gains & loan deficiency payments: Current producers are eligible for
nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, whereby they pledge their harvested peanuts
as collateral for loans from USDA, at the statutorily set rate for all peanuts of
$355/short ton (17.75¢/lb.)  Loans must be repaid within 9 months or else the
borrower forfeits the collateral crop to USDA, which has “no recourse” other than to
accept it in lieu of repayment.  To limit forfeitures, a “marketing loan” feature enables
the producer, when market prices drop below loan rates, to repay the loan at a USDA-
calculated market price and retain ownership of the peanuts.  The difference between
the original loan and the lower repayment rate constitutes the amount of the subsidy.
When market prices are below loan rates, loan deficiency payments (equal to
marketing loan gains) also are offered to eligible producers who choose to forgo such
loans.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits apply.
Tariff-rate quotas:  A tariff-rate quota system is used to limit imports.  Those entering
within quota are subject to low tariffs (no tariffs apply to Mexican and Israeli in-quota
imports); above-quota imports are subject to much higher rates. 
CRS-36
OLIVE OIL: EUROPEAN UNION
Production aid:  Growers receive a subsidy based on the difference between a
“production target price” (fixed at 3,837.7 euros/MT through the 2003/2004 marketing
year) for wholesale marketings of ordinary virgin olive oil, and a theoretical “producer
selling price.”  The subsidy has been fixed at 1,322.5 euros/MT of actual production
through 2003/2004.  Since 2001, only oil from olive groves planted before May 1,
1998, has been eligible for production aid.  There is also a production refund, related
to the import duty on imported oil used in the processing of preserved foods.
Storage aid:  Since 1998-99, private storage assistance has replaced government
intervention purchases as the primary method for removing olive oil surpluses.
Private storage contracts with producer groups and associations generally may be
authorized when the average market price declines to a trigger price, currently 1,664
euros/MT.
Production controls (maximum guaranteed quantity):  To control production and
subsidy costs, an EU-wide maximum guaranteed quantity, set at 1.777 million tons
annually, is apportioned among member countries.  Production above this level results
in proportionate cuts in the level of producer aid.  However, a portion of countries’
production shortfalls can be reallocated to other countries with overproduction; also
a portion of any annual shortfalls can be credited against a subsequent year’s
overproduction.
Export subsidies; export levies:  Because EU olive oil prices tend to be higher than
world prices, export refunds are available to exporters, who compete for them in a
once-monthly bidding system.  Export levies may be applied to protect EU supplies
if world prices are higher than domestic prices.  (The rate has been fixed at zero since
1998.)
Import controls:  Fixed tariffs are applicable, based on type of oil imported; there are
special concessions for Tunisia.  Imports also are subject to licensing.
CRS-37
OLIVE OIL: UNITED STATES
There are no comparable U.S. programs
CRS-38
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES: EUROPEAN UNION
Operational programs/funds:  The EU pays for 50% of the operational costs of more
than 1,000 producer organizations, which conduct such activities as price and supply
management, and quality improvement; grower-members pay the rest.
Compensation for market withdrawal:  Producers are eligible for compensation when
their organizations withdraw as surplus any of about 15 designated fresh fruits and
vegetables.  Aid is limited to a specified (and annually declining) percentage of each
organization’s total marketings of a product.  Withdrawn produce may be distributed
free to charitable groups and institutions, or used for other purposes that do not
undermine private markets.  Rates vary, and were being reduced through 2002/03.
Producer funds may supplement EU funds.
Processing subsidies: Production aid is paid to processors who in turn pay minimum
prices to producers who provide figs and prunes for drying, pears and peaches who
have contracts with producer organizations.  Also, growers of citrus fruits, tomatoes,
peaches, and pears for processing are eligible for assistance.
Bananas: Specified geographically-remote producer groups can receive compensation
for the difference between a “flat rate reference income” for EU produced and
marketed bananas and the “average production income” in the EU market for a given
year.  The EU sets a maximum quantity eligible for payments, allocated among 7
producing areas.  An EU import regime has given preferential entry –  through tariff-
rate quotas and import licenses –  to bananas from so-called African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries that have preferential trading rights and historical links with
EU countries.  The EU since has resolved a dispute with the United States over its
import regime by agreeing to implement a tariff-only system for imports in 2006.  In
the meantime, the EU will establish quotas and a licensing system based on historical
trade shares that should increase the prospects for Latin American banana imports in
the EU market, especially bananas marketed by U.S. firms, while continuing to
provide preferential entry for ACP countries. 
Import measures: Approximately 20 imported fresh fruits and vegetables have an
established entry price.  Imports valued above this price are subject only to an ad
valorem duty; those below the entry price pay not only the ad valorem duty but also
a tariff equivalent in order to bring their price up to the entry price.  A number of
processed products may be subject to minimum import prices.  Certain products are
covered by tariff-rate quotas, and special safeguard clauses that trigger additional
import duties under certain conditions.
Export subsidies:  Some fresh fruits and vegetables and processed products are
eligible for export refunds to bridge the gap between EU and world prices.
Quality standards:  Marketing standards such as quality, size, and labeling apply to
most fresh produce after the farm gate to ensure transparency for buyers and sellers
and to keep unsatisfactory items off the market.  EU countries enforce standards. 
Other aid:  Various aids have been offered for such items as raspberries, hazelnuts,
locust beans, hops, white asparagus, dried grapes, dried figs, apples, and grape juice.
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FRUITS AND VEGETABLES: UNITED STATES
Section 32:  This section of the Act of August 24, 1935 (P.L. 320) provides a
permanent appropriation for supporting a range of U.S. food and agricultural
activities.  Although the program is not designed specifically to support designated
fruits and vegetables, USDA usually devotes a portion of its discretionary funds each
year (for example about $100-150 million per year in recent years) to purchases of
such products (on a bid basis) to help bolster prices.  The 2002 farm law now requires
that not less than $200 million annually in purchases of fruits, vegetables, and
specialty crops be made through Section 32.
Market regulation: The government has given grower-handler committees the
authority to use “marketing orders” to regulate the quality, size, packaging, and other
aspects of marketing (including, sometimes, certain volume controls) for more than
two dozen fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops.  The orders are binding on all
growers and handlers in an area.  Other regulatory and marketing programs include
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act to promote fair trading practices in the
fruit and vegetable industry, and use of government grades and standards for produce.
Ad hoc emergency assistance: Congress from time to time has provided ad hoc
“emergency” economic assistance to fruit and vegetable producers.  Recent examples
were about $159 million for specialty crops via FY2001 supplemental appropriations,
and $94 million for 2000 crop market loss assistance to apple producers via the 2002
farm law.
CRS-40
OTHER CROPS: EUROPEAN UNION
Compensatory payments for protein crops:  These, used with land set-aside
requirements (see below), are part of the CAP’s broader consolidated support system
for “arable crops,” which cover not only certain protein crops (e.g., peas, beans) but
also cereals and oilseeds.  Producers receive direct payments, per hectare (2.47 acres),
expressed in euros per metric ton (63 euros for grass silage).
Land set-aside for protein crops:  Farmers, unless they are small, must set aside a
minimum percentage of their cropland (10%) in exchange for their compensatory
payments.  In addition, protein crop farmers may be eligible for payments for
voluntarily setting aside additional acres.  For member countries that make grass
silage eligible for payments, a separate base area is set.
Dried fodder payments:  Processors receive a flat payment of 68.83 euros/MT of
artificially dried fodder and 38.64 euros/MT of sun-dried fodder.  An EU-wide
maximum guaranteed quantity is allocated, as national guaranteed quantities, among
member countries. 
Compensatory payments for potato starch:  Although potatoes are not included as
arable crops, potato starch is linked to the arable crops regime because it is used as a
substitute for starch from cereal crops.  Producers receive direct payments of 110.54
euros for the quantity of potatoes needed to produce one metric ton of potato starch.
Minimum prices for starch potatoes:  Starch potato producers also must be paid a
minimum price of 178.31 euros/MT of produced starch.  Processors paying these
minimum prices in turn have been eligible for compensation.
Marketing quotas for potato starch:  Quotas for the production of potato starch are
in effect and allocated among member countries.  Some import protections may apply.
Seed for sowing:  Aid may be granted for the production of basic or certified seed (for
sowing) for more than a dozen crops.  A per 100 kg. rate is fixed by taking into
account EU supply-demand conditions and third-country market prices.  Some import
protections apply.
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OTHER CROPS: UNITED STATES
Dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas:  Current producers of these crops are eligible for
nonrecourse marketing assistance loans, whereby they pledge their harvested crop as
collateral for loans from USDA, at statutorily set rates.  These rates for 2002 and 2003
crops are: $6.33/cwt. for dry peas, $11.94/cwt. for lentils, and $7.56 per cwt. for small
chickpeas; the rates decline somewhat in 2004-2007.  Loans must be repaid within 9
months or else the borrower forfeits the collateral crop to USDA, which has “no
recourse” other than to accept it in lieu of repayment.  To limit forfeitures, a
“marketing loan” feature enables the producer, when market prices drop below loan
rates, to repay the loan at a USDA-calculated market price and retain ownership of the
commodity.  The difference between the original loan and the lower repayment rate
constitutes the amount of the subsidy.  When market prices are below loan rates, loan
deficiency payments (equal to marketing loan gains) also are offered to eligible
producers who choose to forgo such loans.  Annual per-person limits on total benefits
apply.
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FARM INPUT, INVESTMENT AND RELATED AID: EUROPEAN UNION
Farm business investments:  Assistance is provided to help cover investments in
farm businesses for modernizing machinery, equipment, and systems, etc.  Combined
EU and member nation assistance is limited to a portion of the eligible volume of
investment, subject to the farmer meeting certain criteria such as being a new entrant
into farming, undertaking environmental practices, etc.
Infrastructural services:  EU programs provide aid for arterial drainage, collective
irrigation schemes, construction of farm roads, etc.
Insurance programs:  Some member countries operate insurance or other types of
risk management programs.
CRS-43
FARM INPUT, INVESTMENT, AND RELATED AID: UNITED STATES
Farm credit:  USDA serves as lender of last resort for family farmers unable to obtain
credit from commercial sources.  USDA provides low-interest, direct farm loans and
also guarantees repayment of loans made by private lenders, which farmers can obtain
either to finance the purchase of farm real estate or to meet operating expenses. 
Irrigation subsidies:  Irrigation water from federal reclamation projects in 17 western
U.S. states is available at lower than market rates to agricultural irrigators because
users effectively are repaying project debt at low or no interest.
Farm storage facility loans: USDA offers a farm storage facility loan program which
offers low-interest, 7-year financing (up to $100,000) for on-farm structures for
storing grains, various oilseeds, and silage.
Federal crop insurance: (See description under “Crop Insurance and Disaster
Assistance: United States,” page 45.)
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CROP INSURANCE/DISASTER ASSISTANCE: EUROPEAN UNION
Natural disaster assistance:  Compensatory payments due to weather, and other
natural disaster assistance have been made available, generally by member countries;
for example, the total spent on such aid in the 1999/2000 marketing year was reported
at 365 million euros.
Crop insurance: There is no EU program comparable to the United States.
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CROP INSURANCE/DISASTER ASSISTANCE: UNITED STATES
Federal crop insurance:  Approximately 70 crops are eligible for federally-subsidized
crop insurance in most (or, for fruits and vegetables, in many) U.S. counties to protect
their growers from unavoidable risks associated with natural disasters.  USDA absorbs
a large percentage of the program losses (the difference between premiums collected
and indemnities paid), subsidizes a portion of producer premiums, and compensates
private companies (who sell and service policies) for a portion of their operating and
administrative expenses.  All eligible producers can receive catastrophic (CAT)
coverage without paying any premium (except a nominal administrative fee).  Under
CAT, producers in designated disaster areas receive a payment equal to 55% of the
estimated market price of the crop, on losses in excess of 50% of normal yield.  A
producer has the option of buying additional coverage.  (Also available is subsidized
revenue insurance; see page 51 for a description.)
Noninsured assistance program (NAP):  Farmers who grow a crop not insurable
under the federal crop insurance program (including mushrooms, floriculture, nursery,
Christmas trees, turfgrass sod, aquaculture, and ginseng), and who applied for aid
before the planting season, may be eligible for direct payments under USDA’s NAP.
A participant must experience at least a 50% crop loss caused by a natural disaster, or
be prevented from planting more than 35% of intended acreage.  Losses above the
minimum loss threshold are covered at 55% of the average market price for the
covered commodities.  An annual payment cap and a gross revenue test apply.
Emergency disaster loans: Family farmers who have production losses of at least
30%, cannot obtain commercial credit, and are in federally designated disaster (and
contiguous) counties, are eligible for low-interest USDA loans to help them recover
from production or physical (structure, equipment) losses. 
Emergency conservation and watershed assistance programs:  Farmers and ranchers
may receive emergency funds for sharing the cost of rehabilitating agricultural lands
damaged by natural disasters and for carrying out water conservation measures during
severe drought.  Farmers also may indirectly benefit from emergency funds that have
been provided – through the Watershed and Flood Prevention Act  – to repair damage
to waterways and watersheds.
Tree assistance program: Subject to appropriations, natural disaster aid is authorized
for commercial growers of trees, vines and bushes, to cover 75% of the cost of
replanting due to natural disaster losses in excess of 15% mortality.
Livestock assistance: The 2002 farm law authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
provide compensation to dairy and other livestock producers for economic losses
related to livestock mortality, feed shortages, “sudden increases” in production costs,
and other losses as the Secretary considers appropriate.  However, such aid is
contingent upon an advance appropriation.
Other ad hoc assistance:  Since 1989, emergency appropriations have provided  $16-
20 billion to compensate farmers for a variety of disaster-related losses. 
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CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENT: EUROPEAN UNION
Agri-environmental measures:  Member countries must offer producers payments for
undertaking, for at least 5 years, farming practices – beyond their usual practices – that
will improve the environment, protect soil and genetic diversity, and maintain the
landscape and countryside.  Maximum annual amounts eligible for EU co-financing
are 600 euros per hectare for annual crops, 900 euros for specialized perennial crops,
and 450 euros for other land uses.  Actual payments are lower because they are based
on a calculation of income forgone.
Aid for less favored areas:  Certain rural areas are considered less favored because
they may be mountainous or have other natural features that increase costs and reduce
yields; they are threatened with abandonment when maintenance of the landscape is
necessary; and/or continued agriculture is important for conservation, environment,
landscape, or tourism reasons.  In these areas farmers can receive compensatory
payments of up to 200 euros per hectare used for agriculture. 
Environmental constraint area payments:  Farmers in areas subject to prescribed
environmental constraints can receive payments of up to 200 euros per hectare to
compensate them for the costs and income losses associated with these constraints.
Such areas are specified by member countries and can be no more than 10% of the
country’s total land area. 
Afforestation:  Support for afforestation of agricultural land is made available as
“annual premiums” to cover management costs for up to 5 years and to cover income
losses due to afforestation for up to 20 years.  Farmers or their associations can receive
up to 725 euros per hectare annually; other private persons, up to 185 euros.  These
premiums are in addition to other EU financial support for forestry development
generally (e.g., 40 to 120 euros per hectare annually).
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CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENT: UNITED STATES
Conservation reserve program: Farmers and other agricultural landowners bid
competitively for USDA contracts to retire erodible or other environmentally sensitive
cropland from production, usually for 10 years.  In return, they receive annual rental
payments (which vary but average almost $50 per acre in recent sign-ups) plus cost-
sharing payments to establish permanent vegetative cover on the land.  The law limits
total national CRP lands to 39.2 million acres.
Wetlands reserve program:  Producers receive payments for long-term protection of
wetlands, through permanent easements, 30-year easements, or restoration cost-share
agreements.  Average FY2001 per-acre costs were $1,200 for permanent easements
(where 79% of WRP land is enrolled), $760 for 30-year easements, and $480 for
restoration cost-sharing.  The law limits the national program to 2.275 million acres.
Grasslands reserve program: Starting in FY2003, producers will be eligible for
payments for placing farmland into grasslands for up to 20 years (for which 40% of
total funds will be devoted) and for 30-year and permanent easements (60% of funds).
National acreage is capped at 2 million acres.
Environmental quality incentives program: This is a cost-sharing assistance program
that generally covers up to 75% of a producer’s cost of addressing soil, water, and
related natural resource concerns on their lands through vegetative practices, land
management practices, or improved structures.  Sixty percent of the annual funds are
targeted to livestock and 40% to crop production.  Total payments per contract (which
can be for 1-10 years) are limited to no more than $450,000 between FY2002 and
FY2007.
Conservation security program: Starting in FY2003, the 2002 farm bill requires
USDA to offer incentive payments to producers for adopting and expanding
conservation practices over 5 to 10-year periods on “working” farm lands.  The cap
on total annual payments ranges from $20,000 to $45,000 per producer, depending
upon the intensity of the practices.
Farmland protection program: This program is carried out through state, tribal, or
local entities to fund the purchase of conservation easements on land having desirable
agricultural production qualities that are threatened by nonagricultural development.
The federal contribution is up to 50% of the total easement cost.  Through FY2001,
nearly 108,000 acres of land on 543 farms were in the program, at an average cost of
$1,740 per acre with the federal share at 27%.
Wildlife habitat:  Cost-sharing assistance is available to landowners for undertaking
on-farm management practices to improve wildlife habitat.  Participants can receive
compensation for up 75% of such costs; overall, the average reimbursement was
$5,825 on average acreage of 149 acres.
Watershed projects: Producers indirectly benefit from USDA’s flood reduction,
sediment, erosion control and water conservation projects (operated cooperatively
with other federal, state, and local entities) under the Watershed and Flood Prevention
Act.
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EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND FOOD AID: EUROPEAN UNION
Export credit/insurance:  Most export subsidies are commodity-specific (see above
sections) or provided by individual EU countries.
Food aid:  Responsibility for the delivery of food aid is divided between (1) the EU,
which distributes its aid mainly through grants to nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and the World Food Program, which usually buy the food from local sources;
and (2) the EU’s 15 member nations, which mainly provide bilateral (country-to-
country) aid.  A Working Group of the European Council of Ministers and a Food Aid
Committee manage and coordinate these (in effect) 16 different programs.  All EU
food aid is provided as donations.  Food aid generally is both humanitarian and
developmental in nature.
  
Market promotion programs:  The EU provides funds for activities similar to those
undertaken through U.S.-funded market promotion programs (see next page), although
virtually all of such support for the European programs comes from individual
countries and from producers.
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EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND FOOD AID: UNITED STATES
Export enhancement program:  Exporters can receive cash payments from USDA
enabling them to complete sales of designated commodities to specified countries at
more competitive prices.  USDA awards bonuses based on a competitive bidding
process among exporters and based on available funding; however, the program has
been used little in recent years.  While most past bonuses have been used to assist
wheat sales, a number of other commodities have been assisted.
Export credit guarantees:  USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
guarantees repayment of short-term (up to 3 years) or longer-term (up to 10 years)
financing of commercial credit extended to eligible countries that purchase U.S. farm
products.  Because repayment is guaranteed by the federal government (the CCC must
assume the debt if there is default), private institutions can offer credit on more
favorable terms.
Food aid:  U.S. government food aid abroad is through three channels: the P.L. 480
program, also known as Food for Peace; Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of
1949; and the Food for Progress Program.  Title I of P.L. 480 provides for
concessional sales of agricultural commodities to developing countries for dollars on
credit terms or for local currencies.  Title II of P.L. 480 provides for the donation of
U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency and non-emergency food needs.
Title III of P.L. 480 provides government-to-government grants to support long-term
growth in the least developed countries.  Section 416(b) provides for the donation
overseas of commodities owned by USDA.  Food for Progress provides commodities
(through P.L. 480 or Section 416(b) authority) to support countries that have made
commitments to expand free enterprise in their agricultural economies.  Non-
governmental organizations are extensively involved in U.S. food aid activities.
Market promotion programs: Through the Market Access Program and the Foreign
Market Development Cooperator Program, USDA supports, through partial
reimbursements to cooperating trade organizations, the cost of such private sector
activities as consumer promotions, trade shows, overseas market research, and
technical assistance, in order to promote foreign markets for various agricultural
products.
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MISCELLANEOUS ASSISTANCE: EUROPEAN UNION
Producer retirement payments:  Farmers over 55 with at least 10 years’ experience
may receive support if they agree to cease all commercial farming.  Payments are up
to 15,000 euros per year, with a 150,000 euro cap, up to age 75.  Farmworkers (family
helpers or paid hands) of the same age who have devoted at least half of their working
time to farm work in the prior 5 years also are eligible for retirement payments of up
to 3,500 euros per year, with a 35,000 euro cap.
Aid for young farmers:  First-time farmers under 40 are eligible for two types of aid:
(1) a single payment of up to 25,000 euros; (2) an interest subsidy for loans taken out
to cover start-up costs (capitalized value cannot exceed 25,000 euros).
General services:  The EU and its member countries fund a wide variety of programs
and activities such as research, producer training and education, marketing and
promotion assistance, quality and certification services, livestock inspection, crop and
animal pest and disease control and eradication.  The estimated total value for these
services reported for 1999/2000 was approximately 6.7 billion euros. 
Agri-monetary aid:  Member countries have granted compensatory aid (to which the
EU has contributed 50%) to farmers due to currency revaluations.  For example, such
payments were reported by the EU to total 957.5 million euros in 1999-2000.
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MISCELLANEOUS ASSISTANCE: UNITED STATES
Revenue insurance:  This is a crop insurance “buy-up” option available since 1997
on a pilot basis for major crops in some regions.  Revenue insurance combines the
production guarantee component of crop insurance with a price guarantee to create a
target farm revenue guarantee for a crop farmer.  An insured farmer who opts for
revenue insurance can receive an indemnity payment when his actual farm revenue
falls below a certain percentage of the target level of revenue, regardless of whether
the shortfall is caused by low prices or low production levels.  Three major versions
of these pilots are: Crop Revenue Coverage; Income Protection; and Revenue
Assurance. 
General services: The federal government and states provide support for a wide
variety of programs and activities such as research, producer training and education,
marketing and promotion assistance, quality and certification services, livestock
inspection, crop and animal pest and disease control and eradication.  The estimated
total annual value for these services is approximately $7 billion, of which more than
$3 billion represents state programs.
